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SPECIFIC FACTORS, CAPITAL 
MARKETS, PORTFOLIO 
DIVERSIFICATION, AND FREE 
TRADE 
Domestic Determinants of the Repeal 
of the Corn Laws 
By CHERYL SCHONHARDT-BAILEY* 
T WO strands of thought relating to Britain's historic move to free 
trade in i846 offer contradictory interpretations of the underlying 
domestic economic and political forces at work. On the one hand, the 
Ricardo-Viner specific factors model implies that owners of two fac- 
tors-land and capital-stood diametrically opposed to one another on 
the issue of free trade. In the end, according to this view, capital gained 
the upper hand as seen in the i846 repeal of the Corn Laws. On the other 
hand, studies in the economic history literature posit that the economic 
interests of these two groups of factor owners were not mutually exclu- 
sive; rather, their interests overlapped as a result of rapid economic 
changes in the i830s that intensified landowner diversification into non- 
agricultural ventures. The implication of the latter approach is that land- 
owners as a group came to be divided between undiversified landowners, 
whose economic interests remained tied to agriculture, and diversified 
landowners, whose interests in agriculture had lessened while their in- 
terests in nonagricultural sectors had increased. Hence, the undiversified 
group remained the only true "losers" from free trade in grain; members 
of the diversified group, by contrast, stood to gain or simply became 
indifferent to free trade. 
* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the i989 Joint Annual Convention of 
the British International Studies Association and the International Studies Association and 
at the i989 All-U.C. Group in Economic History Conference. Comments from John Cony- 
beare, Jeff Frieden, Barbara Geddes, Arye Hillman, David Lake, Peter Lindert, Tim Mc- 
Keown, and Daniel Verdier were very helpful. My appreciation to Andrew Bailey for pains- 
taking editorial assistance, to Dan Steinberg for statistical advice, and to Craig Schonhardt 
for assistance with the tables. Support from the UCLA Center for International and Strategic 
Affairs and the UCLA Department of Political Science made possible the research for this 
paper. 
World Politics 43 (July I991), 545-69 
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546 WORLD POLITICS 
Of course, inherent to both arguments is the assumption that members 
of Parliament voted according to the economic interests of their constit- 
uents. Elsewhere, I have demonstrated the validity of this assumption.' 
The scope and intent of this paper, then, is twofold. First, it discusses the 
specific factors model and its inadequacies as applied to nineteenth- 
century Britain, and it introduces two modifications that allow the model 
to account for the anomalies we observe in the British case. That is, I 
alter two key assumptions of the specific factors model by introducing 
the concepts of portfolio diversification and investment capital flows into 
the framework of factor specificity in the short run. The predicted polit- 
ical consequence of this modified version of the model is that diversifi- 
cation lessened widespread protectionist sentiment among the landed 
elite. In the context of a broader equilibrium model of trade policy lib- 
eralization, it disrupted the initial protectionist equilibrium by decreas- 
ing the political benefits that accrued to M.P.'s from voting in favor of 
protection.2 Portfolio diversification alone did not give rise to free trade 
in Great Britain; but rather it was one of several factors that shifted the 
political cost/benefit ratio of M.P.'s in favor of free trade. 
Second, this paper extends the concept of portfolio diversification, as 
presented in the economic history literature, to the realm of policy- 
making, using a statistical examination of the correlation between dimin- 
ishing protectionist sentiment-through diversification-and the free 
trade policy outcome. 
THE SPECIFIC FACTORS MODEL AND THE LONG- AND SHORT-RUN 
DIMENSIONS OF CAPITAL FORMATION 
The Ricardo-Viner specific factors model in neoclassical trade theory de- 
fines some factor inputs as industry specific and others as intersectorally 
mobile. Industry-specific factors give rise to industry-specific interests 
that may either favor or oppose protection, depending upon the form of 
trade competition facing the industry. Owners of factors specific to the 
domestic import-competing industry gain from protection (via a rela- 
tively higher price obtained from the industry good), while owners of 
factors specific to the export sector lose (similarly, via the relatively lower 
price of the industry good). The preference of the mobile factor owner 
(for example, labor) is ambiguous; that is, although he can move into the 
I Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey, "A Model of Trade Policy Liberalization: Looking Inside the 
British 'Hegemon' of the Nineteenth Century" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Los 
Angeles, i99i), chap. 3. 
2 Ibid., chap. i. 
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protected sector, his welfare remains contingent upon his unique con- 
sumption preferences. It follows that owners of factors specific to a par- 
ticular industry will tend to seek protection for their industry and oppose 
protection for any other industry, whereas mobile factor owners will re- 
main largely inactive. 
Standard trade theory texts applying the specific factors model to Brit- 
ain and the repeal of the Corn Laws posit (i) that landowners (that is, 
owners of factors specific to the import-competing industry) and capital- 
ists (that is, owners of factors specific to the export sector) deriving in- 
comes from undiversified claims to factors opposed each other and (2) 
that after i832 industrialists had taken over Parliament, thereby engi- 
neering the shift toward free trade.3 The standard application of the spe- 
cific factors model to the British case is correct in assuming that factors 
remained industry specific and that trade policy had the effect of redis- 
tributing income, thereby creating unambiguous winners and losers. 
However, the two points posited are incorrect. 
Taking the second point first, while the i832 Reform had extended 
suffrage to many middle-class manufacturers,4 it did not, by i 846, sub- 
stantially alter the composition of Parliament. The Parliament of i841- 
47 remained firmly under the control of landowners. By one estimate, 
about 8o percent of Parliament consisted of the landowning aristocracy 
and gentry.5 Certainly if landowners as a group in Parliament wished to 
halt the repeal legislation, they had the votes to do so. 
It is, however, the first problematic aspect to which this paper is di- 
rected. The specific factors model implicitly assumes that (i) undiversi- 
fied holdings of factors prevail (that is, each person owns only one, or 
primarily only one, factor of production), and (2) capital as a factor of 
production refers to the stock of fixed capital available for productive 
purposes. Extensions to neoclassical trade theory have at times relaxed 
the first assumption but have generally retained the second. Mayer, for 
instance, constructs an equilibrium tariff model that allows each person 
to own more than one factor and that allows factor shares to vary among 
people.6 Each factor owner has an optimal tariff rate, the value of which 
is determined by the individual's factor ownership. The equilibrium tar- 
3 This application appears in Richard E. Caves and Ronald W. Jones, World Trade and 
Payments (Boston: Little, Brown, i985). 
4 Before i832 a significant number of manufacturers would have had sufficient property 
qualifications to vote; they would have done so, however, in constituencies where they con- 
stituted a small percentage of the electorate. 
5 W. 0. Aydelotte, "The Country Gentlemen and the Repeal of the Corn Laws," English 
Historical Review 82, no. 322 (January i967), 51. 
6 Wolfgang Mayer, "Endogenous Tariff Formation," American Economic Review 74, no. 4 
(i984), 97o-85. 
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iff thus hinges upon the underlying factor-ownership distribution, and it 
is the median factor owner's optimal tariff that determines the actual 
tariff rate. Mayer applies the idea of diversified holdings both to the long- 
run Heckscher-Ohlin model and its resulting Stolper-Samuelson Theo- 
rem and to the short-run specific factors model. His intent is not to 
bridge the two models through the mechanism of portfolio diversifica- 
tion; rather, it is to explore the implications of his modified assumptions 
for the long-run adjustment of tariffs to changes in the distribution of 
factor ownership, voting costs, and voter eligibility rules and for the 
short-run attempts of small minorities of factor owners-under majority 
voting-to obtain tariff protection for their industries. 
In contrast to Mayer's application of diversified holdings, this paper 
alters part of the assumption of undiversified holdings in the specific 
factors model and considers capital in two forms-as stocks and flows. 
With regard to diversified holdings, I argue that income accruing from 
the ownership of a specific factor (for example, capital originating from 
the productive use of land) could be invested in other, more profitable 
sectors of the economy.7 As a consequence, the allocation of capital flows 
differed markedly from the allocation of capital stocks. Moreover, this 
flow of investment capital from one sector to another was facilitated by 
the newly emerging market in long-term capital, as evidenced by the 
rapid growth in British stock market activity during the second quarter 
of the nineteenth century. 
Theoretically, the beginnings of a capital market can be interpreted as 
the start of a transition from a state in which capital is fixed to one in 
which it becomes more mobile between sectors. In Britain capital flows, 
responding to unequalized returns, shifted into higher yield industrial 
sectors of the economy, thereby altering the ownership distribution of 
capital stock. (Hence, a corollary argument may be given for capital mar- 
ket creation; that is, the more the allocation of flows diverges from the 
allocation of stocks, the greater the need for a capital market.) It should 
be acknowledged, however, that other forces may have come into play 
to delay the emergence of a long-run equilibrium for returns to invest- 
ment across the different sectors. In the short run the new free-trade 
policy may have added to the existing inequality of returns by rewarding 
the owners of industrial capital (unless the capital market had previously 
fully taken into account the returns from a policy change-an unlikely 
7For an excellent discussion of nineteenth-century British investors' responsiveness to fluc- 
tuations in investment opportunities, see R. C. Michie, Money, Mania and Markets: Investment, 
Company Formation and the Stock Exchange in Nineteenth-Century Scotland (Edinburgh: John 
Donald, 198I). 
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event in such a nascent market). Thus, in the short run capital flows 
could, if sufficient, have generated a trade policy shift that created more 
inequality of returns, not equalization, even though in the very long run 
returns should have equalized. Nonetheless, the essential point is that 
the new ownership distribution created economic and political incentives 
for a policy change that favored owners of industrial stock (for example, 
a move to remove protection for agriculture). This said, the contribution 
of this paper is quite modest: it introduces portfolio diversification in 
nineteenth-century Britain into a medium-run model with a "dynamic" 
component, that is, capital flows that reflect divergent returns in industry 
and agriculture. 
More to the point, however, portfolio diversification significantly al- 
ters the political interpretation originally posited by the specific factors 
model. Protective tariffs continued to be ardently favored or opposed by 
the owners of factors tied to specific industries.8 However, the policy 
stance of factor owners whose returns could be reallocated elsewhere 
became ambiguous. This was so especially where these returns (in the 
form of investment capital) found their most profitable outlet in indus- 
tries specific to other factor inputs. The interests of these individuals 
would have derived from each person's unique portfolio-that is, from 
the extent of diversified holdings or, interpreted strictly, from the dis- 
counted expected future income stream from holdings under each policy 
alternative (the latter clearly more difficult o gauge than the former).9 
Simply put, as landholders diversified more extensively, their interests 
either began to resemble more closely those of industrialists favoring free 
trade or became less sharply defined, thus bordering on indifference. 
Only those individuals who could not diversify out of agriculture (for 
example, tenant farmers and landowners on the verge of insolvency) 
would remain staunch advocates of protectionism.Io Since the specific 
factors model misses the importance of a growing British capital market, 
it fails to recognize that the support for protectionism was diffusing 
8 These were individuals who were under some compulsion-perhaps impending insol- 
vency-to reinvest flows in a factor that yielded less than (an) other factor(s). 
9 In an ideal world one would not engage a static model but rather would look to a dy- 
namic one that incorporated future expected returns. 
'? It should be mentioned that undiversified farmers were enticed by the government to 
acquiesce to repeal, as evidenced most clearly in the "drainage loan" portion of the repeal 
legislation; see D. C. Moore, "The Corn Laws and High Farming," Economic History Review, 
2d ser., i8, no. 3 (i965), 544-6i. Nevertheless, many "marginal" farmers (i.e., grain farmers 
unable to increase production through advanced farming methods or unable to switch to 
other forms of farming) left Britain in the wake of repeal hoping to gain better returns for 
their capital investments in the U.S.; see William E. Van Vugt, "Running from Ruin?: The 
Emigration of British Farmers to the U.S.A. in the Wake of the Repeal of the Corn Laws," 
Economic History Review, 2d ser., 41, no. 3 (i988), 41 I-28. 
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within the ranks of those who supposedly were its leading advocates. 
The division between owners of factors and their supposed conflict of 
interests, then, is much fuzzier than the model implies. 
THE EVIDENCE 
Evidence for the portfolio diversification hypothesis is presented below 
in two forms-empirical and statistical. The former draws from the eco- 
nomic history literature and offers a compelling account of the progres- 
sion of diversification, especially its escalation from the late i820S to the 
i840s, a period of rapid growth in the newly emerging stocks and shares 
market. The latter attempts to establish a link between growing diver- 
sification and M.P. voting behavior on the question of free trade in grain. 
DIVERSIFICATION IN ECONOMIC HISTORY 
Diversification of portfolios by landowners was by no means a new de- 
velopment in the nineteenth century. Beginning in the late sixteenth and 
early seventeenth centuries, both the older aristocracy and the rising gen- 
try invested extensively in nonagricultural activities, including minerals 
and mining (coal, lead, steel, salt, alum, and so forth), urban develop- 
ment, shipping, and joint-stock companies. Lawrence Stone explained 
that even though "industry was not the road to great riches," it provided 
to both peers and gentry an interesting diversion, and an extension of the 
taste for gambling. In his analysis of 158 peerage families during the 
period 1560-i639, Stone found that 25 percent of these profited by min- 
ing activities on their estates; 9 percent invested in fen drainage; 15 per- 
cent in developing London; 14 percent in shipping; and 63 percent in 
trading, colonial, and industrial concerns. Moreover, he found the older 
nobility no less willing to invest in nonagricultural activities than was the 
newer nobility.ii 
J. H. Plumb extended the notion of diversification to the eighteenth 
century. According to Plumb, cheap water transport (provided through 
canal ventures) allowed greater diversification of portfolios among the 
gentry.'2 The opening of rivers and coastal traffic both enhanced agri- 
cultural production by creating new metropolitan markets for agricul- 
tural goods and created new outlets for enterprises in timber sales, 
gravel, and minerals. 
Stone, The Crisis of the Aristocracy I556-i64i (Oxford: Oxford University Press, i965), 
377-83. 
12 Plumb, The Growth of Political Stability in England, i675-I725 (London: Macmillan, 
i967), 5- 
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Consequently, by the early nineteenth century some landowners were 
at least marginally involved in industrial activities. The obvious question 
is then, why, given some degree of diversification, did landowners sup- 
port agricultural protection as long as they did? It may be that (i) land- 
owners diversified but the returns on their nonagricultural income were 
inconsequential relative to their agricultural income, (2) landowners' in- 
vestment in nonagricultural sectors was small relative to their agricul- 
tural holdings, or (3) numbers of landowners actually diversifying re- 
mained few relative to those not diversifying. A fourth and quite 
different explanation is that the type of industrialization in the eigh- 
teenth century differed from that in the nineteenth; whereas the former 
was led by domestic demand, the latter was led by exports. Thus, land- 
owners diversifying into industry in the eighteenth century would likely 
have retained their preference for agricultural protection, whereas land- 
owners similarly diversifying in the nineteenth century would not. In 
any case, two critical economic changes in the second quarter of the nine- 
teenth century the expansion of exports in mining and heavy industry 
and the development of the capital market-marked that period as a 
turning point. There was an increase in (i) returns to diversified hold- 
ings, (2) the size of nonagricultural holdings, and (3) the numbers of 
landowners diversifying. These changes, moreover, transformed the pro- 
cess of investing outside of agriculture all of which dampened land- 
owner support for agricultural protection. Interestingly, both changes 
seem to have been triggered by (or to have coincided with) the same 
event the beginning of the railway boom in the mid-i83os (peaking in 
i836-37 and again in i844-46). 
The first such sudden economic change was the expansion of exports 
in mining and heavy industry. While export growth and the railway 
booms should actually be considered a two-way causal relationship,'3 this 
'3 The literature xplaining the various linkages between railways and the development of 
heavy industry in Britain is considerable. For instance, Llewellyn Woodward wrote that "the 
railways were one of the results of progress in the iron industry and of the increased con- 
sumption of coal brought about by the use of steam power. They were in turn the cause of a 
vast expansion in the metal trades and of a much greater demand for coal. Directly or indi- 
rectly they influenced the development of most industries in the country. [In addition] the 
railway itself was an article of export; British contractors built lines in every continent and 
organized companies to buy them"; see Woodward, The Age of Reform, i8I5-i870 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, i962), 4V. E. J. Hobsbawm found that the "immense [coal] industry, 
though probably not expanding fast enough for really massive industrialization on the mod- 
ern scale, was sufficiently large to stimulate the basic invention which was to transform the 
capital-goods industries: the railway. For the mines not only required steam-engines in large 
quantities and of great power, but also required efficient means of transporting the great 
quantities of coal from coal-face to shaft and especially from pit-head to the point of ship- 
ment. The 'tramway' or 'railway' along which trucks ran was an obvious answer.... Tech- 
nologically the railway is the child of the mine, and especially the northern English coal 
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sudden export growth nevertheless was created in the very industries 
(coal, iron, steel) in which landowners had been longtime investors.'4 
Although their portfolios already included such investments, the inten- 
sity and economic importance of these investments had increased with 
the growth of these industries.I5 
The second change was the development of the capital market. Al- 
though the beginnings of a formal market in capital may be traced to 
long-term borrowing by the state in the late seventeenth century, it was 
not until the early i8oos that the London Stock Exchange drafted a con- 
stitution and obtained its own building. The market of the eighteenth 
century was not a national market; rather, it was concentrated in London 
and largely confined to the trade of government securities.'6 From the 
beginning of the nineteenth century to the mid-i82os, very little share 
trading existed outside London. However, with the repeal in i825 of the 
Bubble Act (which had required all companies to obtain a royal charter 
or an Act of Parliament and made it illegal for any broker to buy or sell 
mine"; see Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution, I789-i848 (New York: New American Li- 
brary, i962), 63. He added that "in the first two decades of the railways (i830-i850) the 
output of iron in Britain rose from 68oooo to 2,250,000 [tons].... The output of coal between 
i830 and i85o also trebled from i5 million tons to 49 million tons. That dramatic rise was 
due primarily to the railway, for on average each mile of the line required 300 tons of iron 
merely for track" (p. 64). 
B. R. Mitchell clearly sketches the correlation between rising demand in the iron and coal 
industries and the railway booms and, moreover, the subsequent royalties accruing to land- 
owners. For example, Mitchell explains that royalties usually consisted of a fixed rent plus a 
royalty paid according to the amount of coal extracted. From the early nineteenth century to 
the i 870s, royalties averaged between 8% and I I% of coal sales, or 6d to 9d per ton, or ?50 
to ?i8o per acre; see Mitchell, Economic Development of the British Coal Industry, I8oo-I9I4 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, i984), 251-58. 
It should be noted that while recent British historiography has discounted the Rostowian 
notion of a sudden industrial "takeoff" period, such revisions have applied not to the heavy 
industry stage of industrialization beginning in the i83os but rather to the period from 
roughly 1780 to i830; see N. F. R. Crafts, British Economic Growth during the Industrial 
Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, i985). Other useful sources that address the 
linkages between railways and the development of heavy industry (not to mention the large 
literature simply on railway development) include P. L. Cottrell, Industrial Finance, i830- 
I9I4 (London: Methuen, ig80); F. M. L. Thompson, English Landed Society in the Nineteenth 
Century (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, i963); and G. N. von Tunzelmann, Steam 
Power and British Industrialization to i86o (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978). 
14 See Thompson (fn. 13) for a discussion of the mineral incomes of several great landown- 
ers (e.g., Dukes of Northumberland and Portland, the Earl of Carlisle, Lords Hastings and 
Rokeby, Sir Matthew White Ridley, and the Earl of Durham) and gentry (e.g., the Claytons, 
Crofts, Bates, Edens, Riddells, Wrightsons). He noted that "landowners certainly drew large 
and increasing incomes from coal, but these were predominantly and increasingly in the 
shape of royalty and wayleave rents" (p. 264). Some gentry received mineral income equal to 
half their total income. 
15 One might add that landowners would be far more likely to invest in industries (mostly 
heavy) that had land occupying a larger share of assets-i.e., coal, iron, railways-than such 
light industries as cotton textiles. 
i6 See, e.g., Cottrell (fn. 13); and E. Victor Morgan and W. A. Thomas, The Stock Exchange: 
Its History and Functions (London: Elek Books, i962). 
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shares in unchartered companies), share trading boomed as joint-stock 
companies-most notably insurance and banking companies could 
now sell their shares on the stock exchange.'7 Further legislative restric- 
tions on the privileges of incorporation were lifted in i834, 1837, and 
i844, thus contributing to the growth of trading in joint-stock compa- 
nies.,8 
More importantly, after the successful opening of the Liverpool and 
Manchester line in i830, confidence in railway stock surged, as evidenced 
by the "railway manias" of the mid-i83os and mid-i840s. After i830 a 
company needed only to advertise in a railway journal that stocks were 
available to be flooded with applications. For example, in i836 the New 
Gravesend Railway received 8oooo applications for the 30,000 available 
shares; the Great North of Scotland Railway, more than three times the 
number of its shares in i845; the Direct Western Railway, 1,400,000 ap- 
plications for its 120,000 shares; and the Direct London-Exeter, 400,000 
for its 120,000 shares.'9 
Aside from later technological changes (telegraph, telephone), railway 
shares offered the single most important factor in the integration of Brit- 
ain's emerging capital market-a common security that could be traded 
actively on more than one market. Without common securities, "local- 
ized imbalances in the supply of, or demand for, stocks and shares would 
continue to result in dramatic price fluctuations and an inability to meet 
requirements. With common securities, local price changes would gen- 
erate an immediate flow from, or to, that centre so that all markets 
would rise and fall in line."20 
Such common securities contributed especially to diminishing the pre- 
viously localized nature of the provincial markets, as active trading be- 
tween markets outside of London expanded throughout the i83os and 
i840s. Elsewhere I illustrate the rapid growth in provincial stockbroking 
and find that railway stocks propelled this growth.21 Indeed, according 
'7Manufacturing and industrial enterprises were not as apt to benefit from the repeal of 
the Bubble Act since, unlike insurance companies whose ownership was corporate, these 
firms largely consisted of partnerships; see Michie (fn. 7), 62. 
i8 See Morgan and Thomas (fn. i6), 125-3I. 
'9 Harold Pollins, "The Marketing of Railway Shares in the First Half of the Nineteenth 
Century," Economic History Review, 2d ser., 7, no. 2 (I954), 233. 
20 R. C. Michie, "The London Stock Exchange and the British Securities Market, i850- 
1914," Economic History Review 2d ser., 38, no. i (i985), 68. 
21 Schonhardt-Bailey (fn. i), chap. 4. Moreover, J. R. Killick and W. A. Thomas provide a 
listing of companies quoted on the Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester, and Newcastle exchanges 
that clearly illustrates the growing dominance of railway shares from I 837 to I 847; see Killick 
and Thomas, "The Provincial Stock Exchanges, I 83-i 870, Economic History Review, 2d ser., 
:z3, no. I (I 970), 96- II I. 
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to one estimate, railway construction accounted "almost exclusively" for 
the establishment of the provincial long-term capital market.22 
Nor was the emerging capital market limited to the English prov- 
inces; as the onslaught of railway and joint-stock promotion swept across 
the country, it sparked similar share trading in Scotland. During the 
period i830-40 the massive expansion in the Scottish coal and iron in- 
dustry led to an expansion of mining and heavy industry, which in turn 
required substantial investment capital.23 Concurrently, the number of 
investors benefiting directly from the output of the enterprise (a feature 
of the earlier localized nature of investment) decreased, while the num- 
ber of investors seeking primarily to maximize the return on tradable 
investment rose. By the end of the i83os a national share market had 
developed in Scotland, with insurance companies and railway shares ex- 
periencing the most rapid growth. The early i84os brought economic 
prosperity and with it surplus funds seeking investment opportunities. 
Given the excess funds in circulation, banks lowered their interest rates,24 
and consequently, stocks became "the most eligible and favourite" form 
of investment. Moreover, during the early i84os higher rates of return 
from railway shares markedly altered the structure of the Scottish in- 
vestment economy by elevating the importance of railway capital at the 
expense of all other investment sectors.25 
Just as railway shares provided a common security for the provincial 
stock exchanges, so too did they link the emerging Scottish exchanges 
with their English counterparts. In i846, for instance, English sharehold- 
ers were the source of 38 percent of the funds provided for Scottish rail- 
ways by large investors.26 This cross-investment was not one-sided, how- 
ever, as Scots similarly sought stock in English railways.27 Finally, in 
addition to the provincial and Scottish stock exchanges, the London 
Stock Exchange itself exhibited the speculative mania associated with the 
railways. From i844 to i846 the annual number of Railway Acts passed 
22 Killick and Thomas (fn. 2i), I io. See also W. A. Thomas, The Provincial Stock Exchanges 
(London: Frank Cass, I973). 
23 Michie (fn. 7) estimates the gross capital formation in Scottish iron manufacture to have 
increased from i.8 million pounds in i828 to 6.6 million pounds by 1840 (p. 5I). 
24 The Bank of England lowered its rate from 6% in late i839 to 3% in i846, while in 
Scotland, the rate fell from 3.5% in i842 to 2% in i843; see John Clapham, The Bank of 
England, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1944); and Michie (fn. 7). 
25 Michie (fn. 7), 92, I 17. 
26 Ibid., 117. 
27 For example, "the Liverpool and Manchester Railway had only io Scottish shareholders 
in i838, but 29 by i845, while the Grand Junction Railway had 4 in i835 and i22 in 1845. 
Scots had invested only ?2000 in the Newcastle and Carlisle Railway in 1838, but ?9,300 in 
i844, while they held ?94,000 of the stock of the Great North of England Railway in 1845 
compared to a mere ?4,700 in i838"; see Michie (fn. 7), I i7-i8. 
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increased from 48 to 270, and capital authorized increased from ?17.8 
million to ?136 million; total railway capital quoted on the London Stock 
Exchange thereby increased from ?72.3 million to ?i26.i million.28 
Stock market activity, however impressive its growth, must necessar- 
ily be joined to the interests of landowners to warrant the claims that (i) 
landowners were indeed diversifying into nonagricultural ventures such 
as railway shares and that (2) this diversification had potential political 
ramifications. In a presentation of the occupational breakdown of share- 
holders in various railway and utility companies, I demonstrate that es- 
quires and gentlemen held a strong interest in such investments.29 One 
historian has conservatively estimated the average percentage of gentle- 
men/landowners among subscribers for all railway companies floated in 
i844-45 to be i8 pecent,30 while others have estimated the figure for the 
period i820-44 to be 28 percent.3' In fact, many railway companies delib- 
erately reserved a certain percentage of shares (say, 20 percent) for land- 
owners. Landowners were considered valuable shareholders not only for 
their resources, but also because a company with a considerable number 
of landowners as shareholders could use this as clout to prevent present 
or future opposition to the railway line from other landowners.32 
Landowner interest in railways stemmed not only from the ownership 
of shares but also from the high prices paid to them by the railway com- 
panies for their lands. Rather than face the possibility of legal battles over 
the value of land-costing four times the price of those purchases un- 
opposed-railway promoters "bought off' landowners by paying them, 
on average, twice the current market value for their land. In fact, in I 844 
the Board of Trade estimated that the excess land costs alone made Bri- 
tain's railways ?iooo more expensive per mile than railways on the Con- 
tinent.33 
Evidence from the economic history literature thus clearly traces in- 
creasing diversification of the landed elite into mining and heavy indus- 
try, as well as railway development. This is not to suggest, however, that 
such diversification directly translated into their conversion to a free- 
28 Morgan and Thomas (fn. i6), io6. 
29 Schonhardt-Bailey (fn. i), chap. 4, presents selected data from Killick and Thomas (fn. 
2I). 
30 S. A. Broadbridge, Studies in Railway Expansion and the Capital Market in England, i825- 
i873 (Guildford and London: Frank Cass, 1970), 144. 
31 G. R. Hawke and J. P. P. Higgins, "Transport and Social Overhead Capital," in Rod- 
erick Floud and Donald McCloskey, eds., The Economic History of Britain since I700 (Cam- 
bridge: Cambridge University Press, i98i). 
32 Pollins (fn. 19), 238. 
33 R. J. Irving, "The Capitalisation of Britain's Railways, i830-1914," Journal of Transport 
History, 3d ser., 5, no. i (i984), 14-15- 
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trade policy stance. Coal, iron, and steel exports certainly became increas- 
ingly more important in the i83os and i840s, but so, too, did domestic 
consumption of these goods (especially for domestic railway construc- 
tion). Additionally, even landowner interests in railway promotion could 
in some cases be linked to the transportation of agricultural goods to 
domestic markets rather than to the development of British export in- 
dustries. Nevertheless, diversification into potentially (and in some 
regions of the country, predominantly) nonagricultural ventures allowed 
landowners to spread their investment risks among various sectors of the 
economy not directly benefiting from the expansion (or maintenance) of 
British agricultural production. As stated earlier, the actual interests of 
these individuals must be derived from each landowner's unique port- 
folio, that is, the diversification of holdings (as a proxy for the discounted 
expected future income stream from his holdings). Either, in the ex- 
treme, landowner interests began to resemble those of industrialists fa- 
voring free trade, or more moderately, their interests imply became less 
sharply defined, perhaps bordering on indifference. 
DIVERSIFICATION AND M.P. VOTING PATTERNS ON FREE TRADE 
Previous studies that addressed the issue of diversification in the repeal 
of the Corn Laws generally focused on the individual interests of mem- 
bers of Parliament. A primary source of motivation for voting, according 
to this view, stemmed from the M.P.'s personal pecuniary interests. (In- 
deed, one historian commented that the reason attempts by the i841-47 
government to regulate railways were doomed was that M.P.'s the ma- 
jority of whom were shareholders in railways and one-seventh of whom 
were railways directors-vigorously defeated any "dangerously restric- 
tive" proposals.)34 The argument continues that M.P.'s were beginning 
to diversify their personal portfolios in the years prior to i846: as they 
increasingly invested in the business and industrial sectors of the econ- 
omy,35 they personally had less to lose and more to gain from eliminating 
agrarian protectionism. 
My test of this hypothesis revealed that a transformation in the in- 
comes of members of Parliament was indeed occurring, though not at a 
34Asa Briggs, The Age of Improvement, I783-i867 (London: Longman I959), 340. 
35 For general references to this argument, see Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dicta- 
torship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, I966); and E. J. Hobsbawm, Industry and Em- 
pire (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, I968). For the specific application of this argument 
to the M.P.'s of i841-47, see W. 0. Aydelotte, "The Business Interests of the Gentry in 
Parliament of i84i-i847," in G. Kitson Clark, The Making of Victorian England (London: 
Methvent, I962), 290-307; and idem (fn. 5), 47-60. See also J. A. Thomas, "The House of 
Commons, i832-i867: A Functional Analysis," Economica, no. I3 (I925); and idem, "The 
Repeal of the Corn Laws, i846," Economica, no. 25 (1929). 
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rate or level sufficient o confirm the hypothesis.36 Timothy McKeown 
tested a similar hypothesis. Although he found a systematic relationship 
between voting behavior and "personal pecuniary interests" of M.P.'s, he 
did not cite this as the-critical factor in the abolition of the Corn Laws.37 
One step beyond gauging the economic effect of portfolio diversifica- 
tion on members of Parliament entails examining its political effects, as 
channeled through diversification by their constituents. It is the argu- 
ment of this paper that as individuals (and constituencies in the aggre- 
gate) invested returns from land into nonagricultural ventures such as 
industry and railways, political support for protectionism waned, and 
M.P.'s accordingly shifted their votes toward free trade. 
Two approaches, differentiated by data type (individual versus aggre- 
gate), are adopted below for testing the relationship between diversifi- 
cation and M.P. voting behavior. Neither approach is ideal, but taken 
together they provide a reasonable test of the hypothesis. A better test of 
diversification would rely exclusively on individual-level data in order to 
capture the "capital as flows" element of the argument. That is, whereas 
aggregate-level data may capture shifts in the overall distribution of land 
and capital ownership (and consequently diversification at the aggregate 
level), the underlying assumption is that all individuals have undertaken 
exactly the average diversification of their personal portfolios by invest- 
ing returns from one factor into another factor. Landowners may instead 
have moved wholly into the industrialists category; alternatively, the 
number of industrialists may have grown more quickly relative to land- 
owners. As such, individual and aggregate-level data will provide differ- 
ent pictures of diversification. Individual-level diversification suggests 
that capital operates as flows and that industry-specific nterests become 
less sharply defined in the political arena. Aggregate-level diversification 
may indeed reflect individual-level diversification, in which case the 
same argument holds; that is, capital "flows" and interests merge. Alter- 
natively, diversification may occur only at the aggregate level, where- 
upon interests remain industry specific: landowners remain tied to agri- 
36 In an earlier phase of this project, I tested this hypothesis. In sum, I found that while 
unmistakable change in the economic interest composition of Parliament was occurring from 
i832 onward, the change was quite gradual. The landowning interest was steadily declining 
while that of business was steadily rising, overtaking the former by the i870s. I concluded 
that it seemed likely that it was not the M.P.'s own economic interest that motivated him, 
but that of his constituents. Transformations in the economic interests of constituents thus 
took several decades to be reflected in the composition of Parliament. 
37 Timothy J. McKeown, "The Politics of Corn Law Repeal Reconsidered" (Paper pre- 
sented at the I987 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, revised 
December I987). 
This content downloaded from 158.143.192.135 on Wed, 16 Apr 2014 04:14:16 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
558 WORLD POLITICS 
cultural protection, and industrialists, tied to free trade, although the 
balance of interests becomes more evenly distributed. 
There are drawbacks to relying solely on microlevel data: such data 
are rare for early-nineteenth-century Britain, and the available data are 
incomplete and inconsistent. Consequently, I test the diversification the- 
sis using both individual and aggregate data. Positive and consistent 
findings at both levels of analysis would support the hypothesis that di- 
versification was indeed occurring at the individual level and that the 
more aggregate-level statistics were an accurate reflection of this diver- 
sification. 
TESTING THE HYPOTHESIS 
Two sources of data were used to test the hypothesis that M.P.'s who 
represented constituencies with greater diversification were more likely 
to vote in favor of free trade than were those representing less diversified 
agricultural constituencies. The first source-death duty registers38- 
provides data at the individual level. The years i830 and i850 were cho- 
sen to construct a random sample of I percent for each year (i62 and I84 
individuals, respectively).39 (Elsewhere I describe the sampling technique 
in full.)40 
The components derived from the registers include (I) stocks (that is, 
stocks or shares in railways, utility companies, canals, joint-stock com- 
panies, insurance companies; investments in a business or trade; and 
mining interests-only when listed separately from real estate), (2) gov- 
38 Barbara English, "Probate Valuations and the Death Duty Registers," Bulletin of the 
Institute of Historical Research 58, no. 135 (May I984), argues that death duty registers offer 
more complete records of business holdings than do probates. For example, the registers list 
stocks and shares, industrial machinery, business interests, and residual estate. They offer 
more details as to the form in which wealth was held at death. Only since I982 have the 
registers been opened to study by researchers for the period from 1796 to 1903. I did find, 
however, that for later years many registers remain closed, some until the year 2007. 
Jane Cox describes and explains the contents, format, notations, and abbreviations relevant 
both to probates and to death duty registers; see Cox, The Records of the Prerogative Court of 
Canterbury and the Death Duty Registers: A Provisional Guide (Canterbury: Public Record 
Office, Prerogative Court of Canterbury, i980). 
39 Since i825 and i846 constitute roughly the critical years "before" and "after" the emer- 
gence of capital markets and diversification, and since we may assume that an individual 
would most likely be at his financial peak not at his death but rather a few years prior, i830 
and i850 appeared to be adequate choices for each time period sample. 
40 Schonhardt-Bailey (fn. i), chap. 4. In brief, however, a mapping of both the i830 and 
i850 samples illustrates a fairly even geographic distribution, with of course the expected 
concentration around London. A comparison of the regional distribution with actual popu- 
lation figures for England in i83i and i851 suggests that the sample distributions appear to 
match the population figures relatively well. It should be noted, however, that in i830 the 
Southeast (including London) and to a lesser extent the Midlands appear overrepresented, 
while the northern regions are underrepresented. For i85I the regions fairly accurately cor- 
respond to the population figures. 
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ernment securities (consols, reduced annuities, etc.), (3) charges on real 
estate (including both absolute and annuity bequests charged on real es- 
tate holdings, and real estate sold whose value was then taxed), (4) cash 
bequests (from bank stock and monies from sources unspecified), and (5) 
residue (which in many cases included the value of real estate property 
when instructions were given for its sale-the proceeds of which were 
then subject to taxation). Unfortunately, real estate was not subject to 
death duty and subsequently was not valued until the early I850s. Vari- 
able (3) combined with variable (5) provides the best proxy for estimates 
of real estate, given the clear overlap between the two. 
An examination of stockholdings by region and county illustrates the 
geographic spread of capital market activity: whereas in i830 stockhold- 
ers appeared in only four counties (all concentrated in London and the 
South), in i850 stockholders appeared in thirteen counties (spreading re- 
gionally from the Southeast and Southwest to include East Anglia, the 
Midlands, the Northeast and Northwest, and Wales). Moreover, the per- 
centage of individuals owning stock increased from 3.7 percent in i830 
to 12.5 percent in i850, also supporting the notion of an expanding cap- 
ital market discussed earlier. 
The second data source-income tax returns-also provides data on 
the extent of diversification, but at the constituency level (that is, borough 
and county) and for the years I814 and i856. Although I814 and i856 
were not "ideal" years (ideal would have been i825 and i845), the lack 
of any income tax structure between i815 and i842 meant that i814 was 
the latest possible year of the first period (excluding the unrepresentative 
final wartime tax year, i815).41 Further, i856 was chosen since it was the 
first year after reinstitution of the income tax that the Parliamentary 
Papers offer a complete county and borough breakdown for all the tax 
schedules. The two years are similar in that both were war years and 
both operated under a virtually identical tax structure.42 
Income tax returns consisted of four schedules: Schedule A (profits 
from the ownership of lands, farm buildings, houses, tenements); Sched- 
ule B (profits from the occupation of lands, houses, tenements-in short, 
profits from farming); Schedule D (profits from trade or manufacturing 
business, profession, employment, or vocation, and miscellaneous items 
such as foreign securities and possessions); and Schedule E (annuities, 
41 As it was the final year of the wartime income tax, returns in i815 dropped sharply due 
to public resistance to the tax and less stringent collection efforts by the Tax Office; see 
Arthur Hope-Jones, Income Tax in the Napoleonic Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1939), 77, io9. Hence, I815 was not considered an appropriate year to sample. 
42 Ibid., i2i. 
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pensions, and stipends paid to holders of public office). An adjustment 
of the data43 enabled me to divide Schedule A into two parts, Ai and A2, 
with the former comprising income from rural landownership and the 
latter comprising income from urban landownership. 
To determine whether or not M.P.'s from constituencies with greater 
diversification were more likely to vote in favor of free trade, I con- 
structed indexes of diversification for each sample. Individual scores 
were averaged to obtain one score for each county in the death duty 
register sample, whereas separate scores could be obtained for boroughs 
and counties in the income tax returns sample.44 Indexes used for both 
samples are given in Table i. The first term in the death duty register 
diversification index (stocks/sum of all Xs) denotes the relative diversifi- 
TABLE I 
INDEXES OF DIVERSIFICATION 
Death Duty Registers 
Xl1 (X3 + X4) 
Diversification Index = 
Sum x's Sum x's 
where 
XI = stocks and shares 
X2 = government securities 
X3 = charges on real estate 
X4 = residue 
X5 = cash, bank stock, money from unspecified sources 
Income Tax Returns 
D Al 
Diversification Index = 
(for counties) Sum (A1,A2,B,D,E) Sum (A1,A2,B,D,E) 
Diversification Index = (D+A2) Al 
(for boroughs) Sum (Al,A2,B,D,E) Sum (Al,A2,B,D,E) 
where 
Al = income from rural landownership 
A2 = income from urban landownership 
B = income from farming 
D = income from trade, manufacture, etc. 
E = income from public office 
43Schonhardt-Bailey (fn. i), Appendix 2. 
44 Further on I separate the votes of M.P.'s into those representing boroughs and those 
representing counties. For the death duty register sample, this means that, statistically speak- 
ing, both sets of M.P.'s are responding to the same county-average diversification score. 
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cation into stocks and shares, whereas the second term (charges on real 
estate + residue/sum of all Xs)45 is the proxy for agricultural holdings.46 
The income tax returns diversification index follows the same approach; 
but it broadens the scope of the first erm to include all profits from trade 
and manufacture, and for boroughs it also includes profits from urban 
landownership. The second term isolates rural landowners as much as 
possible. The diversification indexes range from - i to + i; the higher 
the score, the greater the diversification into stocks and shares (in the 
case of the death duty registers), or the greater the diversification into 
the broader array of nonagricultural ventures (in the case of the income 
tax returns). 
A final clarification regarding the diversification indexes should be 
mentioned. Since the possible scores range from - i (complete invest- 
ment in land) to + i (complete investment in trade/industry/etc.), one 
might surmise that the "perfect," or best, score would be zero. This con- 
clusion might be warranted if one's argument were founded upon a non- 
directional diversification index, that is, one in which industrialists in- 
vesting in land created the same incentive for M.P.'s to vote for free trade 
as did landowners investing in industry. Such an index would presum- 
ably require one to obtain the absolute values of each score and hypoth- 
esize a negative correlation between diversification and free-trade votes 
(where free trade = i and protectionism = o). In contrast, the argument 
here-that landowners were seeking higher returns by investing in in- 
dustry-necessitates a directional index and hypothesizes a positive cor- 
relation between diversification and votes for free trade. The higher the 
score of a particular district, the greater the probability of its represen- 
tative M.P. voting for free trade.47 
45 The real estate estimate for this sample suffers from various coding difficulties. Real 
estate, usually listed as "charges thereupon" rather than as actual values, creates distortion 
due both to inflated values in some cases and to unreported values in others. It is possible 
that these two distortions may have nullified each other, but without better microlevel data 
the extent of the distortions is unknown. Moreover, real estate included not only agricultural 
holdings but also commercial property, and sometimes mining interests as well. Finally, 
while I include "residue" with real estate, not all the residue value could indeed be verified 
as real estate. The effect of these cross-cutting distortions in the estimate of real estate is, 
again, unknown. 
46 Squaring both terms of the equation was considered but dismissed, since the result was 
an increased sensitivity to changes in income levels. In other words, given equal ratios of real 
estate to non-real estate holdings, squaring the terms multiplied the effect of one's income 
level, i.e., a wealthier individual would be predicted to have an exponentially stronger interest 
in either free trade or protection for any given ratio of real estate to non-real estate holdings. 
The unsquared version, being less responsive to changes in income levels, has the advantage 
of isolating to a greater degree the effects of diversification. 
47 Broadly speaking, diversification eed not demonstrate direction. Returns from factor 
inputs need not be channeled from land to capital; the flow could be reversed. The point is 
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Diversification indexes for both samples are divided into "level" vari- 
ables and "difference" variables. The former are simply the diversifica- 
tion scores for each sample year (i830 and i850 for the death duty reg- 
isters, and I814 and i856 for the income tax returns), while the latter 
subtract the earlier year from the later year in order to obtain the change 
in each diversification score over time. 
Tables 2 and 3 give results for all the diversification variables in a 
multivariate probit model, using five separate parliamentary divisions on 
the question of free trade. (The nature of each division is described in 
the appendix; simply put, divisions i846a and i846b are most critical, as 
the former is the first reading and the latter is the third reading of the 
repeal legislation.) M.P. party identification, predicted district trade pref- 
erence (based on economic composition), and the effect of the i832 Re- 
form are included as control variables. I have explored the relationships 
between these variables and M.P. voting behavior on free trade in an 
earlier work;48 consequently, the discussion here is limited to the diver- 
sification variables. 
In brief, positive coefficients and significance for the level diversifica- 
tion variables (Tables 2 and 3) lend firm support to the hypothesis that 
M.P.'s representing constituencies with greater diversification were more 
likely to vote for free trade (that is, for repeal of the Corn Laws). The 
more comprehensive sample of income tax returns provides much higher 
levels of statistical significance than does the death duty sample. Never- 
theless, obtaining as high as 95 percent significance (i846a) for such in- 
dividual-level historical data as death duties is encouraging. Both sam- 
ples exhibit the same trend: each begins with weak significance for 
diversification in i834 and strengthens in significance in i846, as one 
would expect if diversification were increasing during the i83os and 
early i 840s. 
Results for the difference variables (Tables 2 and 3) are far less 
straightforward than those for the level variables. Interpretation of these 
results draws upon earlier findings that established a classic urban-rural 
split between the voting behavior of borough and county M.P.'s, with the 
former significantly more likely to support free trade than the latter.49 
Results in Tables 2 and 3 are divided into subgroups of counties and 
boroughs in order to reveal the puzzling divergence between the two 
samples. That is, in the death duty sample, county M.P.'s do not appear 
that factor returns-as capital flows-will shift from low- to high-yield sectors of the econ- 
omy. 
48 Schonhardt-Bailey (fn. i), chap. 3. 
49 Ibid. 
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to have responded to constituency diversification by voting for free trade, 
whereas their borough counterparts do seem to have responded. The 
results for the income tax returns reveal just the opposite trend: whereas 
county M.P.'s appear to have responded to constituency diversification 
with a vote for free trade, borough M.P.'s do not seem to have responded 
likewise. Before progressing further, it should be acknowledged that 
tests of statistical significance are unimpressive for both samples; inter- 
pretation must accordingly be speculative (especially for divisions i842 
and i846c, where only two M.P.'s from county constituencies voted for 
free trade). Nevertheless, the relative internal consistency of both sets of 
results and the partial statistical significance lead me to venture a specu- 
lative interpretation. 
Recalling that the death duty register sample measured solely the in- 
come from stocks and shares as sources of diversification, we may inter- 
pret the results in Table 2 to mean that the spread of stock market activ- 
ity seemed to contribute to borough M.P.'s voting for repeal, but that this 
one aspect of diversification was not sufficient o dissuade county M.P.'s 
from their protectionist stance. However, if diversification is measured 
more broadly to include all trade and manufacture, as in the income tax 
returns sample, then the magnitude of diversification does appear to af- 
fect the voting behavior of county M.P.'s. The obvious question is, why 
did borough M.P.'s in the income tax returns ample not exhibit the same 
positive correlation? The answer simply put is that in both periods most 
boroughs were far more diversified into industry than were counties; 
thus, reduced but nevertheless till high diversification scores correlated 
negatively with free-trade votes on the part of borough M.P.'s. (Strong 
positive correlations between diversification and free-trade votes for the 
level variables lend support to this interpretation.) A similar result did 
not occur in the death duty register sample since (i) whole county aver- 
ages were adopted for diversification indexes, rather than splitting 
county and borough constituencies, and (2) no doubt as a consequence of 
using whole county averages, initial scores were virtually all very low. 
In sum, while borough M.P.'s appeared more responsive than county 
M.P.'s to diversification by their constituents into stocks and shares, 
county M.P.'s (and probably also borough M.P.'s) did seem to respond to 
more general diversification into trade and manufacture. Thus, for the 
difference variables, the type of diversification (specific, as in stocks, ver- 
sus general, as in trade and manufacture) and the type of constituency 
represented (borough versus county) must be considered if the hypothesis 
of diversification is to be sustained. 
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TABLE 2 
DEATH DUTY REGISTER SAMPLE: PROBIT RESULTS FOR LEVEL AND DIFFERENCE VARIABLESa 
All Constituencies Counties Boroughs 
Level Number of Difference Number of Number of 
Division Coefficientsb (t-ratio) Cases Coefficientsb (t-ratio) Cases (t-ratio) Cases 
1834 Constant -4.38 (-7.42)f 341 Constant -10.39 (-1.25) 86 -4.21 (-6.85)f 218 
BI DIVS23CO 0.24 (0.94) B1 DIVSDIF2 -0.14 (-0.28) -0.13 (-0.50) 
B2 DIV2PID 0.81 (6.28)f B2 DIV2PID 1.61 (0.88) 0.77 (5.59)f 
B3 DISTPREF 0.33 (7.68)f B3 DISTPREF 0.66 (3.78)f 0.20 (3.72)f 
B4 REFCHNG 0.24 (2.92)f B4 REFCHNG 0.81 (0.85) 0.30 (3.39)f 
1842 Constant -8.66 (- 4.16)f 326 Constant -7.85 (-0.04) 95 -8.90 (- 3.93)f 193 
BI DIVS25CO 0.56 (1.26) B1 DIVSDIF2 -0.72 (-0.72) 0.48 (1.26) 
B2 DIV3PID 1.94 (3.92)f B2 DIV3PID 2.52 (0.40) 1.93 (3.58)f 
B3 DISTPREF 0.30 (3.95)f B3 DISTPREF 0.25 (0.67) 0.25 (2.75)f 
B4 REFCHNG 0.25 (1.87)d B4 REFCHNG -0.82 (-0.02) 0.29 (l.94)d 
1846a Constant -2.22 (-4.74)f 372 Constant -2.85 (-0.86) 98 -3.11 (-4.78)f 234 
B1 DIVS25CO 0.67 (2.25)e B1 DIVSDIF2 -0.13 (-0.28) 039 (1.36)c 
B2 DIV4PID 1.13 (10.52)f B2 DIV4PID 1.19 (5.06)f 1.05 (7.58)f 
B3 DISTPREF 0.25 (4.70)f B3 DISTPREF 0.34 (2.11)' 0.08 (1.14) 
B4 REFCHNG -0.08 (-0.72) B4 REFCHNG -0.17 (-0.21) 0.28 (1.63)c 
1846b Constant -2.21 (- 4.66)f 367 Constant -2.58 (-0.69) 95 -3.29 (- 4.62)f 234 
B1 DIVS25CO 0.56 (1.88)d B1 DIVSDIF2 -0.74 (- 1.36)' 0.48 (1.65)d 
B2 DIV6PID 1.15 (10.30)f B2 DIV6PID 1.38 (4.82)f 1.05 (7.34)f 
B3 DISTPREF 0.26 (4.69)f B3 DISTPREF 0.38 (1.85)d 0.06 (0.81) 
B4 REFCHNG -0.10 (-0.95) B4 REFCHNG -0.40 (-0.42) 0.37 (1.95)d 
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1846c Constant -4.15 (-6.68)f 235 Constant -7.18 (-0.03) 59 -4.03 (-6.65)f 154 
B1 DIVS25CO 0.55 (1.28)c Bi DIVSDIF2 0.02 (0.02) 0.17 (0.48) 
B2 DIV7PID 0.99 (6.84)f B2 DIV7PID 2.68 (0.40) 0.88 (5.71)f 
B3 DISTPREF 0.10 (1.71)d B3 DISTPREF 0.15 (0.43) 0.04 (0.53) 
B4 REFCHNG 0.10 (0.99) B4 REFCHNG -1.07 (-0.02) 0.16 (1.50)c 
aProbability of free-trade vote = A + BI (diversification fconstituents' income) + B2 (M.P. party ID) + B3 (predicted trade preference of 
M.P. constituency district) + B4 (effect of i832 Reform on district). 
b DIVS23CO gives the diversification scores for the I83O death duty register sample, averaged for each county; DIVS25CO gives the diversifi- 
cation scores for the i 85o death duty register sample, averaged for each county; DIVSDIF2 is the difference between DIVS23CO and DIVS25CO. 
Variable descriptions are as follows: DISTPREF is predicted trade preference, based upon constituency district economic composition in I83I-32; 
REFCHNG is effect of the I832 Reform Act on electoral constituencies; DIV2PID is party affiliation of M.P.'s, for 1834 division; DIV3PID is 
party affiliation of M.P.'s, for I842 division; DIV4PID is party affiliation of M.P.'s, for i846a division; DIV6PID is party affiliation of M.P.'s, for 
I846b division; DIV7PID is party affiliation of M.P.'s, for I846c division. 
' Significant a  the 8o% confidence level, two-tailed test. 
d Significant at the 90% confidence level, two-tailed test. 
' Significant at the 95% confidence level, two-tailed test. 
f Significant a  the 99% confidence level, two-tailed test. 
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TABLE 3 
INCOME TAX RETURNS SAMPLE: PROBIT RESULTS FOR LEVEL AND DIFFERENCE VARIABLESa 
All Constituencies Counties Boroughs 
Level Number of Difference Number of Number of 
Division Coefficientsb (t-ratio) Cases Coefficientsb (t-ratio) Cases t-ratio) Cases 
1834 Constant -5.58 (-4.60)9 214 Constant -9.19 (-1.27) 110 -5.25 (-4.51)g 104 
Bi TXDIVS14 0.48 (1.81)e Bi TXDVDIFF 2.63 (1.36)d -3.45 (-1.78)' 
B2 DIV2PID 0.81 (4.27)g B2 DIV2PID 1.49 (0.95) 0.71 (3.53)g 
B3 DISTPREF 0.24 (3.97)g B3 DISTPREF 0.50 (3.47)g 0.15 (2.01)f 
B4 REFCHNG 0.45 (1.72)e B4 REFCHNG 0.58 (0.66) 0.67 (2.25)f 
1842c Constant -13.55 (-1.00) 227 Constant -19.64 (-0.20) 126 -24.18 (-1.75)' 101 
Bi TXDIVS56 1.15 (2.45)f Bi TXDVDIFF -3.67 (-0.49) - 14.70 (-2.15)f 
B2 DIV3PID 2.99 (0.88) B2 DIV3PID 2.30 (0.39) 5.73 (1.67)p 
B3 DISTPREF 0.16 (1.37)d B3 DISTPREF 0.15 (0.40) 0.27 (1.80)e 
B4 REFCHNG 0.24 (0.85) B4 REFCHNG 2.41 (0.10) 0.47 (1.25) 
1846a Constant -5.24 (-3.68)9 239 Constant -5.64 (- 2.23)f 130 -5.07 (-2.65)f 109 
Bi TXDIVS56 1.24 (3.60)9 Bi TXDVDIFF 1.78 (1.10) -4.20 (-1.53)d 
B2 DIV4PID 1.21 (7.49)g B2 DIV4PID 1.16 (5.51)g 1.36 (4.10)9 
B3 DISTPREF 0.15 (2.1O)f B3 DISTPREF 0.39 (2.94)9 0.04 (0.47) 
B4 REFCHNG 0.48 (1.40)d B4 REFCHNG 0.50 (0.81) 0.76 (1.53)d 
1846b Constant -4.47 (-3.29)9 236 Constant -5.85 (-2.17)f 127 -5.10 (-2.63)f 109 
Bi TXDIVS56 1.06 (3.16)9 Bi TXDVDIFF 0.51 (0.30) - 1.45 (-0.57) 
B2 DIV6PID 1.18 (7.54)g B2 DIV6PID 1.23 (5.52)g 1.36 (4.16)g 
B3 DISTPREF 0.16 (2.20)f B3 DISTPREF 0.46 (2.98)9 0.03 (0.37) 
B4 REFCHNG 0.28 (0.85) B4 REFCHNG 0.54 (0.82) 0.77 (1.52)d 
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1846c Constant -7.56 (-4.15)9 151 Constant -3.49 (-0.02) 80 -5.83 (-3.90)g 71 
Bi TXDIVS56 1.96 (3.23)g Bi TXDVDIFF 3.00 (0.32) - 1.38 (-0.36) 
B2 DIV7PID 1.49 (4.74)g B2 DIV7PID 3.27 (0.33) 1.46 (4.47)g 
B3 DISTPREF -0.30 (- 2.18)f B3 DISTPREF 0.01 (0.03) -0.30 (- 2.10)f 
B4 REFCHNG 0.31 (0.88) B4 REFCHNG -2.69 (-0.05) 0.38 (1.06) 
a Probability of free-trade vote = A + Bi (diversification fconstituents' income) + B2 (M.P. party ID) + B3 (predicted trade preference of 
M.P. constituency district) + B4 (effects of i832 Reform on district). 
b TXDIVSi4 gives the borough and county aggregate diversification scores for the i8I4 income tax returns ample; TXDIVS56 gives the 
borough and county aggregate diversification scores for the i 856 income tax returns ample; and TXDVDIFF is the difference between 
TXDIVSi4 and TXDIVS56. Variable descriptions are as follows: DISTPREF is predicted trade preference, based upon constituency district 
economic composition in i83i-32; REFCHNG is effect of the i832 Reform Act on electoral constituencies; DIV2PID is party affiliation of M.P.'s, 
for i834 division; DIV3PID is party affiliation of M.P.'s, for i842 division; DIV4PID is party affiliation of M.P.'s, for i846a division; DIV6PID is 
party affiliation of M.P.'s, for i846b division; DIV7PID is party affiliation of M.P.'s, for i846c division 
cIn this division, DIV3PID (M.P. party affiliation) exhibited virtually no variation. In contrast o linear regression, this made obtaining statistical 
significance difficult in probit analysis. 
d Significant at the 8o% confidence level, two-tailed test. 
' Significant at the 90% confidence level, two-tailed test. 
f Significant at the 95% confidence level, two-tailed test. 
6 Significant at the 99% confidence level, two-tailed test. 
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568 WORLD POLITICS 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper focuses on the application of the specific factors model to an 
industrializing country, in this case Britain in the first half of the nine- 
teenth century. I argue that the driving force behind the diversification 
of the asset portfolios of landowners was the rapidly emerging capital 
market, evidenced in the i83os by the spread of stock market activity 
throughout Britain. I attempt to prove that the apparent difficulty in 
reconciling conventional applications of the specific factors model with 
the decision of M.P.'s to repeal the Corn Laws can be overcome by 
switching from a model based on a measurement of the asset stocks of 
voters to one that incorporates the corollary of industrialization, namely, 
the diversification of factor returns from land rents into higher yield 
industrial capital. This makes a model based on income flows rather than 
on capital stocks a more meaningful tool. 
The results at both the individual and the aggregate level reported in 
this paper indicate that as landowners diversified into industry, the po- 
litical benefits accruing to M.P.'s from maintaining protection in agri- 
culture diminished. M.P.'s from districts that were more diversified 
away from agriculture were more likely to vote in favor of free trade 
than were those from less diversified districts. In turn, the diversification 
of districts was a measure of the degree to which individual voters were 
acquiring a range of specific interests that were focused less on agricul- 
tural rents. Thus, there was a lessening of the incentives for M.P.'s to 
defend the Corn Laws and a decisive policy shift by Britain toward lib- 
eralization of trade. 
Early industrializers uch as Britain and the U.S. mobilized capital in 
smaller units, since the average scale of each business was smaller than it 
was for later industrializers. In Britain, the combination of a large role 
for direct investment (in the form of ownership of industrial production 
by landowners) and the early development of securities markets enabled 
profit-maximizing landowners to switch directly into industrial invest- 
ment. It is the hypothesis of this paper that such direct ownership of 
industrial capital was an important factor in changing the trade prefer- 
ences of landowners. Turning to cases of later industrialization (for ex- 
ample, Germany and Japan) in which larger sums of initial capital in- 
vestment were required, the dominant actors responsible for managing 
the flow of investment capital were banks. The requirement for larger 
sums of investment capital created a role for banks as providers and 
thereby limited the direct involvement of landowners in the diversifica- 
tion of their portfolios (though this does not provide an explanation for 
why in some countries banks rather than securities markets were the 
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REPEAL OF THE CORN LAWS 569 
major source of capital-raising activity). Landowners were able to invest 
in banks whose role was to mobilize the capital needed for larger units 
of production and that could pool the risks to an extent that could no 
longer be done by individuals investing directly. This paper has found a 
link between direct investment in industrial capital and a change in trade 
policy preferences; however, where the investment link is indirect, via a 
bank that pools risk by spreading its assets across economic sectors, it is 




1826. Mr. W. Whitmore's motion for the consideration of free trade in 
corn (April i8, i826): ayes = 8i; noes = 250. (Division included only 
the minority M.P.'s and of these, only 65 could be identified by district.) 
1834. Mr. Hume's motion for a committee on the Corn Laws (March 6, 
I834). This was the first motion on the Corn Laws to be brought forth 
in the reformed Parliament: ayes = i55; noes = 3I2. (Two M.P.'s vot- 
ing no could not be identified by district.) 
1842. Mr. Villier's motion to abolish all the duties on corn (February 24, 
i842): ayes = go; noes = 393. (Two M.P.'s voting no could not be iden- 
tified by district.) 
i846(a). Mr. P. Mile's amendment to delay the House going into com- 
mittee to consider the Corn laws by six months (thus forcing a vote on 
Peel's motion that the House immediately resolve itself into a committee 
of the whole, i.e., Peel's first reading of the Corn Law Repeal) (February 
27, i846): ayes = 337; noes = 240. (One M.P. voting aye could not be 
identified by district.) 
i846(b). Mr. Peel's motion to repeal the Corn Laws, third reading (May 
i5, i846): ayes = 327; noes = 229. (All M.P.'s identified by district.) 
i846(c). Mr. Villier's amendment calling for total and immediate repeal 
of the Corn Laws (versus the gradualist nature of Peel's motion, with 
complete abolition of duties in i849) (March 6, i846). The House divided 
on the question that Peel's motion retain the I849 date: ayes = 265; noes 
= 78. (Ayes coded as a vote for protection, and noes coded as a vote for 
free trade. Districts of two M.P.'s were questionable but were coded ac- 
cording to my best guess estimate.) 
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